The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 42

Number 2

Article 9

May 1975

Life-Saving and Life-Taking: A Comment
Richard A. McCormick

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq

Recommended Citation
McCormick, Richard A. (1975) "Life-Saving and Life-Taking: A Comment," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 42:
No. 2, Article 9.
Available at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol42/iss2/9

Life-Saving and Life-Taking: A Comment
Richard A. McCormick, S.J.
Father M cCormick is on the
staff of the Kennedy Institut e,
Center for Bioethics, in Washington, D.C. He has been a frequent
contributor to Linacre and other
professional journals.

The desperately ill and dying
patient occasions many moral
problems: the extent and quality
of medical care and support, the
institutional organization of intensive care units (cf. Tagge in
this issue) , the meaning of extraordinary and ordinary measures of life support, the moral
difference between omission (allowing to die) and commission
(taking life) , the provision of
spiritual, psychological and familial comfort, the extension of
policies and attitudes with regard
to adult terminal patients to babies, and so on.
All of these - and there are
many more - are moral aspects
of our treatment of the seriously
ill and the dying. We tend to
think of morality in far too narrow terms, terms that restrict the
notion to certain baseline external
acts. Actually, the morality of
conduct includes far more. It
must take into account inten110

tions, desires, dispositions, attitudes, emotions. Medical care
involves persons dealing with persons - and both medical proffessional and patient, being persons, not only perform or receive certain services, but do so
in a context of accompanying
emotions, desires, attitudes. beliefs, intentions, biographies. The
overall moral quality of healthcare cannot be separated from a
consideration of such factors.
For instance, it is not impossibly difficult to state that the
Christian attitude toward life and
death is one that sees life as a
basic good, nut not an absolute
one, and death as an evil but not
an absolute evil. Such a balanced
attitude then translates into the
practical distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means to
preserve life. This distinction, being highly relative to circumstantial conditions, is often difficult
to describe precisely. But it becomes even more difficult in its
application to this or that patient
if we remember that the phrases
"reasonable hope of benefit to the
patient" and "no reasonable hope
of benefit" must take account of
the patient's attitudes, emotions,
past life, value-priorities etc. The
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simple little sentence so often
uttered at the bedside of a dying
patient "He would not want this"
- this sentence leads to or accompanies the judgment that a
particular means is for this patient, all things considered, extraordinary and nonobligatory is a sentence into which is packed
a rather thorough personal knowledge of the patient, his points of
view attitude to life and death,
religious values, etc., with all the
intuitive and spontaneous dimensions that are involved in such
knowledge.
Feelings, attitudes, perceptions,
beliefs, dispositions, therefore, do
have an important place in the
morality of our actions and omissions, and the decisions we are
called upon to make. But can
such personal factors and other
empirical data be overstressed
and be given a decisive moral
relevance they do not have? I believe so, and want to use a recent
discussion to lift up this point
for further consideration.
The discussion concerns the relationship between infanticide and
abortion. The following problem
has been raised: does the moral
reasoning used with regard to
protecting fetal life prior to viability bear any relationship to
the protection of neonatal life? Or
more concretely, if one approves
abortion for serious genetic defect, must he in moral consistency
approve infanticide for those who
have slipped through the amniocentesis screen? Worded differently, if one rejects neonatal
euthanasia (active) for terribly
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deformed babies, must he in logical consistency reject abortion
for the same disease?
Three Responses
There are three responses to
this question in contemporary
moral writing. The first is that
of Paul Ramsey.l He contends
that the very arguments used to
justify abortion will also justify
infanticide. He makes his point in
urging his moral position on abortion - an intervention he rejects
as immoral except in the most
exceptional instances (involving,
for example, the lib of the mother). Thus if we refuse to commit
infanticide, we ought also, Ramsey argues, to reject abortion. For
the two procedures are, in their
decisive moral dimensions, not
that different.
The second position is associated with Joseph Fletcher. 2 He believes there are no clean and
clear-cut moral differences between abortion and infanticide.
However, he arrives at an entirely
different practical conclusion from
that of Ramsey. Fetal life is subhuman and may be aborted where
prenatal diagnosis reveals deformity. The same conclusion is
advocated where euthanasia of
elderly patients and defective
newborns is concerned. He writes:
If we are morally obliged to put
an end to a pregnancy where an
amniocentesis reveals a terribly defective fetus , we are morally obliged
to put an end to a patient's hopeless misery when a brain scan reveals that a patient with cancer has
advanced brain metastases.
Furthermore . . . it is morally
evasive and disingenuous to sup-
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pose that we can condemn or disapprove positive acts of care and
compassion but in spite of that
approve neg a t i v e strategies to
achieve exactly tlie same purpose.
This contradiction has equal force
whether the euthanasia comes at
th e fetal point on life's spectrum
or at some terminal point postnatally .·1

Both of these positions (Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher), remarkably different in conclusion
as they are, share a common conviction: prenatal and postnatal
situations do not differ morally
in any decisive ways. If one is
willing to abort in certain cases,
he should be willing to perform
active euthanasia on babies in the
same disease situation. If one is
unwilling to perform active euthanasia on a newborn, he should
be unwilling to abort it earlier.
The third position is that of
John Fletcher. In a recent study
in the prestigious New England
Journal of Medicine , he attempts
to show that there are morally
relevant differences between abortion and euthanasia. 4 On the
basis of these differences his position is one of rejection of active
euthanasia for newborns, but acceptance of abortion following
prenatal diagnosis of severe deformity .
Here I wish to examine these
differences to see if they go so far
as to distinguish abortion and
neonatal euthanasia morally. I
wish to argue that Fletcher's
three differences do not distinguish the two and that therefore
a position advocating or justifying abortion after prenatal diag112

nosis of severe impairment is one
that, in moral consistency, ought
to advocate or justify neonatal
euthanasia. And similarly, a position that rejects neonatal euthanasia (as John Fletcher does)
ought, in moral consistency, to
reject abortion also (as John
Fletcher does not).
If this point can be argued successfully - or more accurately, if
it can be shown that Fletcher's
arguments are not persuasive it may be somewhat clearer how
perceptions, intentions, dispositions and other empirical and personal data, while morally relevant
and terribly important in some
areas, are not that decisive in
others.
Fletcher's first alleged "morally
relevant difference" bet wee n
abortion and neonatal euthanasia
is the separate physical existence
of the infant apart from the
mother. This separateness, he
says, "confronts parents, physicians and legal institutions with
independent moral claims for care
and support." Contrarily, "before
extrauterine viability the wellbeing of the fetus should not be
considered independently fro m
the mother's condition." Fletcher
sees as "extreme" the position
that regards the fetus as already
a human being because such a
position "provides no rational
grounds for the legitimate interests of parents, family and society
to be expressed and guided in
abortion decisions."
Here it must be insisted that
separate physical existence does
indeed confront parents, physiLinacre Quarterly

cians and legal institutions with
independent moral claims. And
the fetus' intrauterine existence
does indeed mean that the treatment of the fetus cannot be considered "independently from the
mother's condition." Classical
theology has always granted this.
Nor, I would add, can the mother's con d i t ion be approached
medically in total independence
of the fact that she is pregnant.
That being said, however, the crucial question is this : while the
claims of the separate child are
independent, and the claims of
the fetus occur within a dependency relationship, are these independent and dependent claims
that different ? And if they are,
on what grounds? Physical dependence and separateness are
but facts. To' say that a moral
claim is dependent is not to delineate the strength of that claim.
The classical position , of course,
has been that the moral claims of
the fetus are very strong, indeed
so strong that only life-saving interventions (e.g., ectopic pregnancies) or their equivalent are
compatible with the rights of the
growing fetus. Fletcher simply
does not address this issue, and
for that reason his first difference
does not establish a morally relevant difference between abortion
and euthanasia; Fletcher merely
asserts such a difference.
The Second Major Difference
Fletcher's second major difference between abortion and neonatal euthanasia is "the fact that
after birth the disease in the infant is more available to physiMay, 1975

cians for palliation or perhaps
even cure. Confrontation with disease in an independently existing
life requires physicians to respond
within their obligations to heal
and to relieve suffering." I fail
to see how the availability of disease to treatment distinguishes
abortion from euthanasia. Granted, it is difficult if not impossible
to treat the fetus in utero in
many cases. All that means is
that it is difficult or impossible.
How does one use that difficulty
to establish a morally significant
difference between two actions
which are in no sense treatment
of the fetus and child, but destructive acts visited upon either
fetus or child?
If Fletcher accepts "availability to physicians for palliation or
perhaps even cure" as establishing a morally significant difference between abo r t ion and
infanticide, it must be because he
supposes that if one is unavailable
(in utero) for palliation or cure,
he may be disposed of. But that
has nowhere been established in
his study, and indeed is at the
heart of the abortion controversy.
Fletcher concludes: "For the
present . .. the real situation for
parents and physicians is that
they must wait until birth to respond to the specificity of a disease with decisions to treat or not
to treat. " True, but" therefore
what ... ?
Fletcher's third morally relevant difference is that "parental
acceptance of the infant as a real
person is much more developed at
birth than in the earlier stages of
113

pregnancy." He then states that
"we should expect loyalty to the
developing life to grow, change,
and moderate the ambivalence
about the fetus usually present in
the parents." Here several things
must be noted. First, granted that
acceptance is much more developed at birth, the question remains open and untouched about
what even the initial acceptance
ought to be, about what it
ought to prescribe and proscribe
with regard to fetal life.
Secondly, granted that loyalty
(or better, a sense of loyalty or
experienced loyalty) grows as the
fetus grows, the question remains
open and untouched about what
even the initial stirrings of lbyalty
demand of us where protection
of fetal life is concerned. Fletcher
nowhere addresses these questions and they are essential if the
differences he identifies are to
add up to moral differences between abortion and euthanasia. If
Fletcher argues that this growth
and change in the sense of loyalty
to nascent life establishes a morally significant difference between abortion and euthanasia,
it is only because he has supposed
that it is a greater or lesser sense
of parental loyalty that founds
the fetus' rights and claims, and
generates our obligations to it.
A Manifestly Erroneous Position
This is not merely undemonstrated; it is, I believe, manifestly
erroneous. It is not our sense of,
experience of loyalty or acceptance that shapes our obligations.
It is rather the objective reality
of the fetus that ought to found
114

our obligations and nurture our
sense of loyalty. If that sense of
loyalty in early pregnancy is such
that it allows abortion, then we
must deal earnestly with the possibility that our sense of loyalty
is not what it should be, that it
has been blunted by cultural
forces, etc. To say otherwise is
to make the fragile and vulnerable sense of acceptance and
loyalty normative-which would,
among other things, collapse morality into headcounting. In summary, in appealing to the sense
of acceptance and loyalty, Fletcher has appealed to human perceptions. To accept these as establishing a "morally relevant
difference" between abortion and
euthanasia of the newborn is to
accept human perceptions as normative - which is, unless something further is added, to forfeit
the capacity to criticize these
perceptions.
Fletcher's study concludes with
this statement: "The effect of
these three differences is to establish the n€wborn infant, even
with a serious defect, as a fellow
human being who deserves protection on both a legal and ethical
basis ... " Clearly, the newborn
are fellow humans deserving of
protection. But if Fletcher's main
contention (moral difference between abortion and euthanasia)
is to stand up, he should have
concluded: "The effect of these
three differences is to establish
the fetus as not a fellow human
being." Fletcher has not succeeded in doing this.
I have raised this question here
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precisely in order to underline
both the moral relevance of personal factors (perceptions, dispositions, attitudes, etc.) and the
limits of this relevance. While
such factors do have input and
importance in the quality-of-life
judgments so often hidden in the
terms "ordinary" a nd "extraordina ry" means,.' they do not, I submit, found and constitute the
very existence and personhood of
the individual. Unless that is kept
in mind, the lives and rights of
others will be endangered .
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